Let us see this in the light of Self Deception where B=A. So an individual holds a
view that ~p and tries to deceive himself into believing that p. By the time he
deceives himself he has already change his view to that p.
How do we distinguish the acts of successful deception and change of view by the
single identity A? How does A suddenly change to the view that p?Could that
change of view in itself not be self deception? If yes then both the acts are
those of self deception. Why cannot they be the same?
view that ~p and tries to deceive himself into believing that p. By the time he
deceives himself he has already change his view to that p.
How do we distinguish the acts of successful deception and change of view by the
single identity A? How does A suddenly change to the view that p?Could that
change of view in itself not be self deception? If yes then both the acts are
those of self deception. Why cannot they be the same?
The only way to save the argument is that A has developed two states of mind
analogous to multiple personality which he is able to process separately (thanks
to the interplay the confusion has caused in his mind forcing him to weigh
options)until he allows them to converge without contradictions.
analogous to multiple personality which he is able to process separately (thanks
to the interplay the confusion has caused in his mind forcing him to weigh
options)until he allows them to converge without contradictions.
Can dream be the second state of mind? Maybe I believe that ~p and try to
deceive myself that p in my dream. However when I wake up I find myself
believing that p knowing that I had just deceived myself in my dreams to believe
that p. However there is no time overlap.This still does not take the concept
further.
deceive myself that p in my dream. However when I wake up I find myself
believing that p knowing that I had just deceived myself in my dreams to believe
that p. However there is no time overlap.This still does not take the concept
further.
The problem lies in the proposition that how can A deceive B if B knows that A is deceiving B (in case of A=B).Then B can deceive itself only if it is self deception of B. But this leads to an never ending argument as the question of self deception keeps shifting from proving Self Deception of A to proving Self Deception of B or essentially self deception of one entity A=B.
What if A before deceiving B deceive himself into believing that it shall not
deceive B but finally goes on to deceive B?
deceive B but finally goes on to deceive B?
Say this can be put logically as A believes that ~p. A also believes that in telling B
that p is not deceiving B.
Or maybe A believes that ~p is itself not a statement believed completely by
A. This uncertainty causes A to experiment beyond A believes that ~p which could
be A believes that p or A believes that q’ as A is not sure which one is true and
that A believes that ~p just for the moment appears to be more true.
that p is not deceiving B.
Or maybe A believes that ~p is itself not a statement believed completely by
A. This uncertainty causes A to experiment beyond A believes that ~p which could
be A believes that p or A believes that q’ as A is not sure which one is true and
that A believes that ~p just for the moment appears to be more true.
If one cannot non-intentionally or if one can only intentionally deceive then why
do we have such intentions?
Who/What motivates us? Who/What motivates us if self deception is
non intentional?
Why cannot someone non intentionally cause some one to believe something that
is false?
is false?
If A believes that ~p, A can make believe B that p if B does not believe A.
A says that A believes that ~p
B says That B believes that ~A
B believes that p
A decides not to convince B of ~p. A is deceiving B by not telling him ~p as A
wants to keep it to himself intentionally or assumes that B also believes ~p non
intentionally. This argument has come along with no logical conclusion.
So let me attempt to try another explanation.
wants to keep it to himself intentionally or assumes that B also believes ~p non
intentionally. This argument has come along with no logical conclusion.
So let me attempt to try another explanation.
What if A is already “mistaken “or self deceived about A believing that ~p (that is
A does not know that A believing that ~p is a result of self deception).Then A
believing that ~p convinces B that ~p (which is shared deception without any
intention of deceiving B).But the problem of the value (Truth or False) of the
concept of self deception is still not concluded.
A does not know that A believing that ~p is a result of self deception).Then A
believing that ~p convinces B that ~p (which is shared deception without any
intention of deceiving B).But the problem of the value (Truth or False) of the
concept of self deception is still not concluded.
Let us attempt to go from state of A believing that ~P to B believing that p again.
Can this state of A be in his dreams?
The presence of a belief in itself without the existence of or at least the knowledge
of existence of a “perceived truth” is in itself a self deception. So we can say that
B is in a state of deception because it is not aware of the origin of B believing
that p or the authenticity of any such origin (that is A believing that ~p).This
argument is also applicable to A=B.
of existence of a “perceived truth” is in itself a self deception. So we can say that
B is in a state of deception because it is not aware of the origin of B believing
that p or the authenticity of any such origin (that is A believing that ~p).This
argument is also applicable to A=B.
Also A believing that ~p may deceive B to believe that p by not using p but q. A
asks B if B believes that q. B says B believes that ~q. A comes to believe B and
that B believes that ~q and that B believes that some P or that B believes that
some p(in case P happens to be p).
asks B if B believes that q. B says B believes that ~q. A comes to believe B and
that B believes that ~q and that B believes that some P or that B believes that
some p(in case P happens to be p).
Hence it is possible for A not to disbelieve that ~q and so A can convince B
without deceiving him intentionally.Hence the second proposition of the Lexican
theory seems to be falling although I still seemto be convinced that Self Deception
is not possible in accordance with the first proposition of the lexican theory.
without deceiving him intentionally.Hence the second proposition of the Lexican
theory seems to be falling although I still seemto be convinced that Self Deception
is not possible in accordance with the first proposition of the lexican theory.
Can A believing that p and A believing that ~p not exist at the same time. If yes
this would simplify and revolutionize the whole discussion that we have been
having .This question came to my mind when I came across this specimen of art.
this would simplify and revolutionize the whole discussion that we have been
having .This question came to my mind when I came across this specimen of art.
I can make out two ways of seeing at the image. However I am not sure if I
actually can see the two oR maybe only think of two or just appreciate the
existence of two viewpoints at the same time. I am sure that I can appreciate the
existence of two views at the same time as that is what I am mentioning
right now. I would also risk myself into saying that I can think of both at the same
time. I am not sure how well can I see the two views at the same time.
Or is it that after seeing those two different images (from one picture) and
appreciating there individuality in case (on the assumption that one cannot sense
them at the same time with clarity, not commenting at present on the type of
sense that should have been mentioned) the whole proposition has changes from
A believing anything to A believing Z where Z is that “I (A) believe that I am
seeing a single (of specific dimensions in space) picture in two different viewsof the same dimensions in space, however not sure with what accuracy
but enough to acknowledge such a possibility”?
The question that now comes to mind is that why only some pictures cause
deception or allow observance of multiple views and not others?
deception or allow observance of multiple views and not others?
It is maybe to do with the fact that those which can cause illusions (illusion
actually not existing as all the views interpreted are possible and the image or
picture cannot be characterized or identified by only one of those
views as different people have different views) have the images which we can
easily identify with having been exposed to them earlier (recollection
phenomenon).
actually not existing as all the views interpreted are possible and the image or
picture cannot be characterized or identified by only one of those
views as different people have different views) have the images which we can
easily identify with having been exposed to them earlier (recollection
phenomenon).
Let me also attempt to give a proposition of twisted deception to end the series
of arguments.
of arguments.
I f I believe that p but believe that ~p as I also believe q
Where q
: I do not believe in myself, or
: I am always wrong in what I think, or
: I take wrong decisions
Then perhaps I believe that p and that ~p at the same time.
As the conclusion I would like to say that I came close to not accepting the second proposition of the “Lexican Theory” of self deception while at the same time not coming in conflict or not having been able to oppose the first proposition of the same theory. The analysis has to have elements of my own deception or the not so apparent desire to convince the reader (deceive the reader in case whenever I change my views) of my present state of views.
References
[1] Shelley Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self Deception and the Healthy Mind
[2] Daniel Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths: The psychology of self deception
[3] William L. Fridley, Playing with the Self: Self Deception and Education
[4] Alfred R Mele, Self Deception Unmasked